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Strange Notes on Modern Statistics and
Traditional Popular Religion in China:
Further Reflections On the Importance of Sinology




1. Translating Symbols and Handling Data
This short note argues that there are some astonishing similarities between the
organization and management of national statistics in contemporary China and the
ways how the state dealt with popular religion in Imperial China. The note builds upon a
more general and longer paper devoted to reflections about the importance of social
and economic history for the application of modern social science in the context of
modern Chinese studies (Herrmann-Pillath, 1995a). In recent times there is a strong
trend towards the substitution of sinology as a philological discipline in the broad sense
(or, a hermeneutical in the narrow sense) by "Modern Chinese Studies" based on the
application of social sciences on China. In Germany, the movement affects, for instance,
the distribution of funds and the structural changes of departments for Chinese studies.
The intellectual legitimacy of these changes is provided by the assumption that there
is a stock of knowledge about societies in general which can be applied on certain data
that can be defined and compiled independently from those general research tools (for
a related discussion in Asian studies, see e.g. Buck, 1991). However, the question can
be raised whether such kind of a clear distinction between data and analytical
instruments can be upheld in the majority of the cases. I would like to discuss this
question by comparing two completely different realms of social phenomena, i.e.
religion and statistics. The latter is, of course, the paramount example of drawing a neat
line between data and instruments: If certain conventions are followed how to define,2
how to gather and how to organize data, the economist's analytical toolbox can be used
all over the world and at any point of time without essential modification. Seemingly,
there is no dependence of data on the theories applied, sometimes going as far as
simply putting even theories aside in order to detect pure causal relationships within a
certain set of data (e.g. Granger-causality tests) (but see Hoover, 1993).
The case of traditional religion in Imperial China is just at the opposite of this kind of
positivistic reasoning. In order to understand the meaning of certain religious symbols
one cannot simply rely on a set of universal rules governing the construction of data
about religious behavior. Instead, we have to use theory already when taking our first
steps toward understanding the symbols, albeit of a different kind as the economist's
theories. If we want to understand single symbols of religion as data we cannot but rely
on a full-fledged interpretive theory about the whole universe of symbols because there
is no "objective" reference of those data independent from the context of the entire
system of religious ideas. That is to say, we cannot first understand single symbols and
then go ahead with gathering additional "data" in order to construct that symbolic
universe as an empirical phenomenon. We need to develop a general idea about a
certain religion, namely, an interpretive theory, already before and during the
accumulation of additional empirical knowledge about that religion. This is, basically
speaking, Quine's problem of the indeterminacy of translation, and the way how to deal
with it (see Gochet, 1984, chpt. four).
Hence we realize that there seems to be a substantial difference between the data
used by economic theorizing and the data used by sinology: In the first case there is no
need for translation and therefore no need for putting the meaning of the data into the
framework of a complete symbolic system which is constructed by the sinologist's
interpretive theory. Philological knowledge features a strong interaction between the
observer's theories about the meaning of the symbols and concepts of another culture.
The symbols themselves cannot be treated as something objective like economic data.
However, at a closer look the situation is not as easy for economics. Most data in
economics which are used to prove certain theories implicitely depend on the
application of certain theories already when defining the data or more general empirical
phenomena (see Lind, 1993). Aside from very simple quantitative data like statistics on
population most economic data either presuppose a certain interpretive stance (like
interpreting GDP as indicator for welfare) or even take a full-fledged economic theory
already for granted (for example, interpreting aggregate factor incomes as being
determined by marginal productivities in order to do growth accounting presupposes
neoclassical theory). Most economists do not treat those methodological prerequisites
openly, suggesting that their data reflect reality in a direct way (see the actual relevance
of the problem of growth accounting in East Asia, Krugman, 1994). Hence at a second3
look there seems to be a closer methodological relationship between philology and
general theory than generally accepted (however, see Stegmüller, 1979). In the case of
economics this affinity can be even stronger because many economic theories are
partly determined by certain views of the world which belong to the "ideographic" realm
(Gudeman, 1986).
In the case of statistics this possibly closer relationship comes to the fore in a
different context, too. Statistical data are not simply manna from heaven but have to be
gathered and organized by human beings. The data presuppose the existence of a
complex system of norms and institutions which govern the behavior of the people who
actually do the statistical work. Therefore the question should be raised whether there
can be an interaction between certain cultural determinants of human behavior and the
activity of doing statistics. If this is the case, we could argue that data are not simply
objective data but that data feature certain characteristics which are not universal but
which are context-dependent with reference to the society within which they are
processed.
In that regard the problem of data would come very close to the problem how to
understand symbols in other areas of social life. For if there are certain general cultural
determinants of using symbols and applying rules there could emerge a common
pattern of behavior in superficially unrelated special fields of symbolic behavior (for a
theoretical foundation, see Herrmann-Pillath, 1993, 1994). For instance, the two
activities of using data as symbols which are processed within certain administrative
structures and of handling religious ideas as symbols disseminated within a certain
polity may feature certain family similarities because both kinds of human action take
place within the same political culture. If this political culture does not change too much
within a certain historical period we could even venture the hypothesis that such family
similarities can be observed between unrelated areas of social action in different times.
Let us substantiate this presumption by analyzing traditional popular religion in China
and modern statistics. In both areas we observe a certain tension between the society
interpreting symbols autonomously and the state imposing certain rules how to
interprete and how to use symbols. Therefore we observe an interaction between
structures of power and the use of symbols in society. Our hypothesis results to be that
the constancy of certain structures of power is reflected in certain family similiarities of
using symbols in both realms. We try to lend support to this hypothesis by short
sketches of the relevant areas in isolation and then comparing both observations. Our
conclusion will make the methodological point that even in the case of allegedly
"objective" data there is a strong need of basing the interpretation of those data on
sinology as philology.4
2. Statistics in Contemporary China:
The Challenge of Imposing Discipline on Administrative Behavior
One of the most intriguing observations on modern statistics in China is the fact of
the very strong interaction between sociopolitical change and statistical work. Since
1949 the Chinese state has faced enormous difficulties in building a reliable statistical
system (the story is told by Yue Wei et al., 1990). The devastating results of the Great
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution are well known, leading to a complete
detachment of political action from economic reality. Since 1978 most observers would
agree that the state has been successful in developing a modern statistical system and
the respective institutions and organizations, thereby considerably enhancing the
capability of the government to survey and to control the economic process (Naughton,
1992).
Notwithstanding there are still many problems with statistics which became more
serious during the recent years. The rapid changes in Chinese society pose a challenge
to statistical work: For example, the mere growth of the number of autonomous
economic organizations altered the dimensions of the statistical task tremendously.
Statistical work presupposes a certain level of organizational capability of the state: The
state should be able to get access to the relevant information, to control its accuracy
and to impose sanctions on deviant behavior.
This is a general problem of any statistical system. In the development of the Western
states statistics was closely linked with the rise of the nation and in particular, in the 20th
century, with the world-wide wars (see Abramovitz, 1989, chpt. one). Governments
needed to know about the comparative economic potential of their nations and they had
to control the use of resources in order to maximize the input into their war-machines.
Without this immense pressure on Western societies the empirical foundations for
applying economics on macroeconomic phenomena would never have been built. From
the viewpoint of economic theory, this is evident because complying with the tiresome
demands of governments for statistical figures means providing a public good which
sometimes (as in the case of taxation) even runs against private interest. Therefore, the
development of the statistical system is part and parcel of Western state-building like
the tax system or the police. So it deserves the same attention in comparative studies
which try to assess the relative position of Chinese state building (like Mann, 1987, or
Cohen, 1988).
In 1994 and 1995 the Chinese government has faced and is facing considerable
problems in statistical work. In many reports published in the Chinese press we could
read about fake figures and misreporting by local governments (e.g. Zhongguo tongji,5
No. 11, 1994, pp. 10ff., Ya Tai jingji shibao, 8 December 1994). Some people have
begun to argue that the degree of data falsification has reached a level where serious
problems for policy analysis on part of the Central government emerge (FBIS-CHI-95-
123, 27 June 1995, p. 36f.). Delegates of the 1995 NPC meeting have been quoted
with statements that faking and even fabrication of figures is a widespread problem
("shifen pubian, shifen yanzhong", in Zhongguo tongji, May 1995, p. 9f., compare also
FBIS-CHI-95-119, 21 June 1995, pp. 44f.). Some people have begun to compare the
situation with the times of the Great Leap Forward. During the recent survey on the state
of the statistical system more than 70.000 cases of deviant behavior in statistical work
have been uncovered (FBIS-CHI-95-043, 6 March 1995). Therefore, there is now a
close link between the campaigns and investigation against corrupt cadres and the
tough government measures against deviance in the statistical system.
Of course, we cannot know the real extent of the problem. But judging from the many
examples quoted by the Chinese reports cases of data fabrication can be of a
Potemkin kind, meaning that, for instance output is outrightly inflated by 100-200%. The
problem is particularly serious in the area of rural industries where estimates hint at a
"water content" ("shui fen") in output figures of between 30-40%. Whether any of the
reported cases is representative or not remains difficult to assess (e.g. FBIS-CHI-95-
054, 21 March 1995).
Notwithstanding, the Central Statistical Bureau argues that Chinese statistics are still
reliable (South China Morning Post, 21 January 1995). The crucial argument supporting
this optimistic view refers to the fact that the most important statistical indicators like
price indices, grain production or urban average incomes are no longer inferred from
the data handled by the respective government departments on different levels of the
administrative hierarchy. Instead, today the State Statistical Bureau relies on a system
of representative samples which are investigated into by the Bureau itself, without any
direct participation and hence interference by local governments (see the statement in
Zhongguo tongji, May 1995, pp. 11ff.). The results of those direct surveys are used to
correct the data provided by other institutions: For example, the 1994 governmental
data on the growth of industrial production resulted to indicate a growth rate of 27%
whereas the samples of the Statistical Bureau only indicated a growth rate of 18%
which was eventually published by the Bureau.
It is still too early to assess the final success of the efforts on part of the State
Statistical Bureau since so far the scope of the sampling techniques is limited and the
organizational support in certain areas is still weak (for instance, independent research
teams on industry are just being established).
All the reports on deviance from administrative regulations on statistics refer to the
behavior of local governments and dependent statistical organizations. Thus the new6
approach by the State Statistical Bureau may also be seen as an indicator of the
serious problems of coordination and of conflicts between the local and the central level,
which now simply should be circumvented by getting direct access to local information.
That is to say, the issue at stake is not only related to the challenge of gathering data
within the context of a rapidly changing economy of a developing country. The
deteriorating quality of statistics is caused by outrightly deviant behavior of the people in
charge of that work who distort information in spite of being able to do better.
Since 1949 statistics in China is part and parcel of her political economy. In recent
times two different aspects of statistics seem to have contributed to the problems just
mentioned, which have also been important in former decades. First, reports about the
results of economic development are an important yardstick for assessing the work of
local cadres. Second, at the same time manipulation of figures can be a useful weapon
for the protection of local interests against higher-level governments. Although both
factors seem to work in a different direction, the first fostering compliance with Central
demands, the second deviance, the final result is a strong inclination of lower-level
cadres to manipulate the statistical data and breaking Central rules. In 1994 the Central
government even had to rely on the practice of sending work teams all over the country
in order to check and sanction local cadres dealing with statistics. The national
investigation on the implementation of statistical regulations produced a somewhat
awkward picture in particular of the situation in the rural areas (Zhongguo tongji,
December 1995, pp. 19ff.; FBIS-CHI-95-061, 30 March 1995): For example, villages
produced output figures for companies which did not even exist. There is now the saying
that "statistics raise cadres, and cadres raise statistics" ("shuzi sheng guan, guan
sheng shuzi").
But why is this possible at all, given the fact of tight control in other areas of the
polity? There seems to be something more involved because there is another source of
statistical inaccuracy which is somewhat legitimate. As a matter of fact, statistical rules
and regulations can be applied with considerable local leeway. Many readers of the
State Statistical Yearbook may have hit upon the small note that the procedures of
National Income statistics might differ between the Central and the provincial level (e.g.
Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1993, p. 40, no longer noted in the most recent 1994 edition).
Indeed, the Chinese statistical system is built along the same lines as the general
administrative structure of the People's Republic, meaning that there is a systematic
distinction between imperative authority ("lingdao guanxi") and  professional authority
("yewu guanxi") within a generalized "dual track" approach to political-administrative
leadership (see Ma Hong et al., 1986, pp. 58ff.).
Since January 1984 statistical work has to follow the "Law on Statistics" ("Zhongguo
renmin gongheguo tongji fa") as well as a parallel resolution by the State Council7
released on January 6, 1984 ("Guanyu jiaqiang tongji gongzuo de jueding") (cf. Yue Wei
et al., 1990, pp. 97-101). According to those regulations statistical work should be
highly centralized ("shixing tongyi lingdao, fenji fuze de tongji guanli xitong"). The
"Resolution" even announced that from that time on personnel on the county level and
above will be organized by the State Council and that all basic administrative expenses
will be born by the State Planning Commission. Yet, on the other hand the local
Statistical Bureaus continue to be parts of the local government organization and, in
most cases, to be the executive institutions. That means that they should obey to central
regulations on statistical work but at the same time should pay respect to local
conditions (compare explicitely Chen Dong/Niu Zhili, 1990, pp. 1300f., and Wei Yue et
al., 1990, pp. 118ff.). Therefore, independently from the unified legal framework the
administrative system is still one of dual leadership ("shuang zhong de lingdao tizhi").
One of the quoted surveys explicitely assigns the administrative leadership ("xingzheng
shang de lingdao") to the respective local governments and the professional ("yewu
shang") leadership to the upper-level Statistical Bureaus.
Hence the Central Bureau of Statistics has no full-fledged imperative authority over all
the organizational copies of its organization on the different levels of government, and
the same is true for the relation between provincial statistical bureaus and the counties.
We find a similar pattern of organizational replication without hierarchical integration as
in most other areas of the Chinese political and economic system (compare
Potter/Potter, 1990, pp. 143ff., and my analysis of inflation and the financial and fiscal
system in Herrmann-Pillath, 1991). Hierarchical authority focuses on certain procedural
rules and formal patterns of administrative design but does not encompass the whole
organization, in particular the way how the administrative rules have to be applied under
certain circumstances, i.e. the application of conditional rules.
How far this may lead becomes obvious in extreme examples like the almost crazy
figures on provincial urbanization in the provincial statistical yearbooks (see Herrmann-
Pillath, 1995b, p. 26, and table 1-5). There are sometimes pronounced changes of the
urbanization rates from one year to another as well as incredibly high figures for poor
provinces like Anhui and Guizhou. The observations give rise to the question whether
the category makes sense at all. Since the mid-eighties, when urbanization rates were
manipulated by local governments for the first time the national statistical administration
is not capable of implementing general and binding rules outside the scope of the
national census (cf. Chan, 1994; Wu, 1994).
In this case obviously there are systematic differences in interpreting the unified rules
between the provincial statistical bureaus. But there may be many other examples
where we simply cannot realize whether rules are applied differently because on the
surface no difference can be discerned. For instance, data on investment might refer to8
many different special categories in different provinces. That is to say, we need to
distinguish clearly between the formal aspects of defining and systematicizing kinds of
statistical data in China and the reference of the data which is established by the
statistical work on the different levels of the administration.
If we try to get out of the mess by using leading handbooks for Chinese statistics, we
are disappointed. Nobody seems to know how the rules are applied exactly. In official
publications there is no clear cut information even about the normative formal
framework, not to speak of implementation. Most important and highly sensitive figures
like the Consumer Price Index and hence the inflation rate are simply left in a cloud of
indeterminateness (South China Morning Post, 18 March 1995). We do not know how
this index is constructed and how the different statistical organizations of the provinces
deal with the regulations and definitions. Although the general procedures give the
impression of a comprehensive and accurate methodology (Zhongguo tongji, May
1995, pp. 30f.), on the other hand the sheer quantity of goods included in the reference
basket of goods (more than 1500) raises doubts whether such a complex system can
be handled in the Chinese setting. Perhaps such an almost perfect system of price
measurement overstretches the administrative capabilities of the statistical system by
far.
Taking both topics together which we have considered so far, namely deviant
behavior and procedural fuzziness, we might conclude that the overall quality of Chinese
statistics is still in doubt. This is in stark contrast with the increasing availability of data
from China and moreover, with the convenience how they are presented to the Western
observer (with, for instance, the Statistical Yearbook of China now being edited
bilingually). To put it bluntly, there is now a nice surface but still a deep and troubled
water. Many Chinese economists finally agree if doubts are raised regarding the quality
of data. But nobody is able to assess the severity of mistakes which finally occur on the
aggregate level. Sometimes people simply adopt the view that mistakes in the average
will cancel each other.
If we try to put these insights in positive terms we conclude that resulting from
different reasons modern Chinese statistics reveals a high degree of structure and
complexity but a very low degree of semantic definitiveness. That means, categories
and definitions are well developed but the real interpretation of content is highly variable.
The latter observation refers to the local level in particular. Therefore we can
characterize the symbolic system of statistics in China as featuring a formally
homogeneous syntax on the national level but a localized semantics.
Since we cannot but discern this difference by analyzing single cases on the local
level we are not able to assess the aggregate situation. Within one statistical category
on the national level many different referents can be lumped together. Of course, this9
amounts to the simple insight that aggregate figures in China maybe meaningless
unless they are produced by one single national organization which imposes certain
procedural rules upon all of its members, and unless its members are able to apply
those rules in a uniform way all over the country. This is precisely done by the State
Statistical Bureau since a couple of years. But we still need to wait for the final result.
Meanwhile we might venture the hypothesis that the cleavage between formal rules and
semantic reference may have some deeper reasons. We could interprete our
observations in terms of the problem of state-building and emerging state-society
relationsships during modernization. We could refer to theories of administrative
behavior and political culture. Or we could indulge in some strange comparative
reflections.
3. Traditional Religion and Localized Belief Systems
The reader familiar with some aspects of traditional popular religion in China will
immediately realize that the last summarizing description of the modern statistical
system fits remarkably well into our growing knowledge about the relation between state
and popular religion in Imperial China. Basically speaking, the Chinese state tried to
impose structure on folk rituals but at the same time left a very broad range of actual
interpretation. Evelyn Rawski (1990, p. 97) put it into the following statement:
"(...) the essential ambiguity of Chinese symbols reflects the state's emphasis on
standardization of structure, but not of content. Cultural integration took place on the
level of formal ritual, but there was no doctrinal unification. The Empress of Heaven
was popular precisely because she could mean different things to different people."
In a well-known parlance, there was no orthodoxy but orthopraxy (on those concepts
see Schmidt-Glintzer, 1983). Conformity and deviance were not defined according to
inward subjective beliefs but outward behavioral performance. In popular religion this
difference became visible in the widespread use of certain religious symbols, gods and
ghosts all over China which at the same time was (and still is) linked with a myriad of
different stories and interpretations of those symbols, in particular regarding local
differences of story-telling. Those differences go back on a long history of diffusion and
metamorphosis of meanings of certain symbols which nevertheless have retained their
formal identity. The formal stability of use provides means of identification throughout
space and time while at the same time even the most basic features of meaning could
be changed. For instance, in contemporary Taiwan the Earth God (Tudi gong) has now
assumed the role of a family-centered protective God whereas in former times the Earth
God was closely related with the territorial unit (neighborhood, village etc.) (see10
Pennarz, 1992, pp. 67ff.). But this fundamental change does not affect the outward
appearance of that God. Beliefs seem to be virtually independent from the use of
symbols.
Conventionally, the distinction between orthopraxy and orthodoxy refers to the
interpretation of Chinese religion and worldview exclusively, in particular regarding Max
Weber's analysis of the relationship between Confucianism and other so-called
Chinese religions in terms of a possible tension between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. But
if we recast the argument simply into the more general statement that there was a
distinctively Chinese way how to handle important symbols in social life we might be
able to draw far-reaching comparisons between distant areas of social life. The only
common aspect needs to be the basic distinction between formal features of certain
symbols (e.g. material structure of temples) and semantic reference, e.g. meaning.
Going ahead from that baseline, we can even compare traditional religion and modern
statistics in China.
The Imperial state invested a lot of effort into the symbolic integration of China in the
field of popular religion although on the other hand there was no encompassing church
which would have been capable to impose one belief system onto the people (a useful
introduction into popular religion is offered in Eastman, 1988, chpt. three). In
comparison to the Christian parish the religious communities of China were highly
fragmented although there was a remarkable formal similarity of symbols all over the
empire, for instance regarding the identification of a territory as community by means of
the Earth God just mentioned and the artistic features of the temples. But whereas the
Christian priest indeed was an instrument of the Church for implementing actual
changes of people's behavior and beliefs (for the case of kinship rules and behavior,
see Goody, 1983), the Chinese state stopped at a certain line and left the actual
organization of the temples and rituals to the laymen. This attitude, of course, provided
the basis for the local variety of meanings.
The decisive causes of the fragmentation and fuzziness of popular religion were first,
the indeterminateness of meaning of the core symbols, and second, the essential
openness of certain rituals.
Regarding the former we can tell the story of many traditional Gods which referred to
very different ideas during the times and at different places with interpretations diffusing
between the regions of the empire (Watson, 1985). This semantic variety was possible
although during the last millenium the Confucian state constantly tried to integrate the
myriads of local gods into the bureaucratic heaven of the state cult. In periods of a
strong autocratic rule like the early Ming this amounted to administrative procedures of
standardizing Gods and temples and convoking the territorial Gods from all over the
Empire in order to give them Imperial blessing (for a survey see Wang Yi, 1994). Hence11
the religious practicioners all over China regarded many Gods as being part and parcel
of a supernatural copy of this-wordly government, or even simply as two aspects of the
same cosmic bureaucracy (Duara's, 1988, pp. 132ff. expression). However, those
administrative procedures did not impose a more than diffuse and general meaning of
the symbols which therefore could be interpreted fairly differently by the people, and the
State had to focuse its efforts towards standardization on single Gods in order to
achieve a near-monopolization of meaning, as in the case of the Confucianization of the
Guandi myths under the Qing (ibid., pp. 139-148).
Regarding the second cause of fragmentation, orthopraxy e.g. in death ritual did only
mould certain parts of the ritual, leaving other parts completely unaffected which could
diverge widely in the empire (Watson, 1990). The funeral ritual was highly homogeneous
all over the country probably because, amongst others, funeral rites were closely
connected with the ritual of inheritance which in turn is linked with basic notions of
kinship. Mourning and inheritance were only two sides of the same coin of organizing
the sequence of generations and were therefore in the center of attention during the
process of confucianizing Chinese society since the Neoconfucian revival (Ebrey,
1991). However, the burial rites were fragmented to a large and conflicting degree such
that sharp subethnic differences in behavior were displayed. Burial rites had an
important practical significance, too, since territorial claims were asserted by the
distribution of gravesites, so that the high degree of variety cannot be explained by
insignificance of that part of the death ritual. Hence, the two parts of the death ritual were
not systematically linked within one single, overarching belief system because the
different parts could be at variance with each other without affecting the outward unity,
for instance, of ancestor worship.
As is well known, a similar variety did occur in other areas of religious and social
behavior, too (see Liang Zhiping, 1994). For instance, the Confucian state tried to
impose one set of marriage and kinship rules onto society but finally did only succeed in
regulating certain areas and leaving others unaffected. Hence there was a considerably
regional and temporal variety, for instance, regarding the relationship between married
daughters and their natal families. But such a variety did not mean that there was not a
certain baseline on which every Chinese would agree as being a reliable indicator of
"Chineseness" even in the very flexible field of traditional religion (Freedman, 1979).
This baseline is the common reference to a certain basic set of formal distinctions
between symbols.
Where did these limits to standardization of meaning and ritual come from? Many
people will be inclined to refer to the state of economic development and hence the
infrastructural constraints for the Imperial State which seemingly could not invest the
administrative ressources in order to achieve a complete monopoly of meaning e.g. by12
means of the village compact ("xiang yue"). This argument has been made, amongst
others, by Ray Huang (1988) with his point about the final failure of establishing an
"arithmetic" system of rule after the Song dynasty. But in Europe the Church was able to
standardize marriage rules and belief systems to a remarkable degree long before the
West attained a level of economic development surpassing that of China. In general, the
trend of standardization in Europe seems to be completely independent from the level of
economic development. Instead, the crucial difference between Europe and China
seems to lie in the relevant structures of power, like, for instance, the absence of a
competing system of different loci of power in China (compare Bünger, 1987) and
certain cultural principles of ordering the relationship between power and knowledge
(called "core principles" in Hallpike's, 1986, comparison between Chinese and Indo-
European societies).
Our contention now results to be that a crucial aspect of those structures of power
refers to the ways how the authority to give meaning to symbols is shared between local
communities and the ruler, and how this authority over meaning determines the
allocation of other sources of power like the use of violence.
Max Weber pointed out that Daoism, which belongs to the intellectual roots of
popular religion, is implicitely heretic and counterbalances Confucian orthodoxy.
However, this interpretation simply transfers the European structures of power into
traditional Chinese society where the conflict between orthodoxy and heterodoxy was
not the main issue. Indeed, a larger part of Daoist doctrines and symbols of popular
religion was fully integrated into the spiritual mirror of the social structures of power
which the Confucians developed vigorously since the Song dynasty (Ge Zhaoguang,
1994). Just because content was not as important as form the state was flexible enough
to draw many possibly heterodox symbols into the official symbolic cosmos, reflected in
the bureaucracy of Gods and Ghosts and the Confucian pantheon. But this also meant
that heterodoxy was integrated into orthopraxy in an essential way. Just as the state
was able to reinvent the meaning of symbols in order to get them under orthopractical
control, this interpretive force could also serve heterodox ambitions. To overemphasise
a bit, the same symbol could be used by both sides in order to express their beliefs. As
long as this conflict was not linked with real clashes of interest both meanings could
coexist, giving rise to the much quoted "tolerance" of Chinese religion, which however,
has its limits in the unity of ritual behavior.
This kind of a potential heterodox orthopraxy is often neglected by descriptions of
Chinese religion, which might be also explained by the fact that most field studies have
been realized in Taiwan. There indeed the government succeded in controlling most
possibly heterodox aspects of traditional religion in order to integrate it into a national
cultural system which at the the same time reflects bureaucratic integration (see13
Pennarz, 1992, esp. pp. 138ff., and Chun, 1994). However, as Feuchtwang's (1992)
careful attempt at reinterpretation has been able to demonstrate, even this
standardization of formal structure (e.g. regulating the days of religious feasts) did not
succed in monopolizing meaning. To put a complex story in simple terms, even the
cosmic bureaucracy can be interpreted in a heterodox way because any God who is
invoked to give protection against demons may herself attain a demonic nature (ibid., p.
51, 56ff.). Feuchtwang argues that this essential ambiguity is reflected in the two views
of the hierarchy of Gods either as a civil bureaucracy or as a military order (along the old
wen/wu distinction). The successful use of violence against demons implies demonic
power, and precisely because the heavenly bureaucracy includes means for the
identification of territorial units and other groups, this kind of demonic violence could
also be seated in the community as distinguished from the "Others", possibly including
even the physical power of the representatives of the ruler (ibid., p. 73ff., 198). And
indeed, Gods like the Tudi Gong have their firm roots in the cosmic bureaucracy as well
as in the tradition of religious mass movement closely related to Daoism (see Schipper,
1977).
Such kind of a complete reversal of meaning is implicit in Daoist ritual where the
priest as an individual is believed to be able to identify with the Jade Emperor, which
implies that a member of the local group could reach close to the upper spheres of
Heaven, even beyond the top of worldly power (Feuchtwang, 1992, pp. 165-179. In this
sense we could indeed speak of heterodoxy but should immediately refrain from doing
so because as a matter of fact the underlying values and most fundamental beliefs were
not conflicting ones. This is why one could even argue (as Ge Zhaoguang, 1994, does)
that the Daoist value system is by no means in contradiction with the Confucian one.
Yet, those values are to a large extent formal variables, like the virtue of loyality:
Depending on actual reference, loyality may be devoted to the real Emperor and his
bureaucracy or to the local community and its militia (compare again Feuchtwang,
1992, pp. 160ff.).
So we may understand Chinese popular religion to a large extent as a means for
regulating the use of violence within a certain structure of power, where the actual use of
violence is regulated by the adoption of the authority to give meaning to a certain set of
shared symbols. Of paramount importance is the relation between locality and center.
The shared set of symbols provides the base for cultural integration, whereas the variety
of meaning provides the base for competing claims to power (for a related view, see
Siu, 1989, pp. 76ff.).
The difference between this kind of symbolic integration and the Western kind of
intellecual standardization of meaning became explicit when in the first decades of our
century the modernizing Chinese state tried to fight against popular religion as a14
superstitious practice (Duara, 1991). Truly integrating religion in the structure of the
state was a formidable task which met considerable and sometimes fierce resistance
by society. When the Nationalist government released the "Standards for Preserving
and Abandoning Gods and Shrines" in November 1928 the main problem resulted to be
the completely arbitrary distinction between "superstition" and "beliefs" which could be
seen as being useful for society. This distinction simply could not work out because
within traditional religion reference was not universal, and because only reference could
have been linked with social function. Distinguishing symbols according to function was
impossible, yet did mean a fundamental change of the formal structure of the symbolic
realm of Chinese religion.
This point can also be made against the background of the more common distinction
between "ritual" and "belief" (Feuchtwang, 1992, pp. 8ff.): Distinguishing between
superstition and socially beneficial beliefs would mean that the unity of ritual and belief
in traditional Chinese religion has to broken into two parts. But what if just the ritual itself
is the social function, with people even sharing the formal symbolism without caring for
the reference, i.e. the beliefs? From that point of view, even the distinction between
"orthopraxy" and "orthodoxy" is misleading because the distinction between belief and
behavior is still upheld. We realize that our topic may lead us to even more basic
categories of the Chinese world view but we cannot follow this way now (compare the
discussion about the "aesthetic" character of Chinese culture which essentially means
unity of form and content, Liu Dong, 1994, elaborating on Li Zehou, in particular).
Let us conclude our short discussion of traditional popular religion by going back to
Evelyn Rawski's remark quoted at the beginning. We cannot discuss the reasons why
such a peculiar system of using symbols has developed in Chinese society. Suffice to
note, amongst others, that it should have been quite well adapted to the fluid state of
Chinese society as being in a state of constant inner colonization where one of the
crucial problems of social order was the relationship between autonomous local
communities and central power (this view of China as an extremely mobile "inner
frontier society" does not seem to be shared by the majority of historians but is
developed convincingly by Nishizawa, 1992, and seems emerge from Naquin/Rawski,
1988, too). Such an argument would fit well into a similar ambiguity of the Imperial
propagation of kinship norms which served at the same time as a means of establishing
decentralized order and supported the possible rise of community (i.e. lineage) power
against central power.
The observation, that the relationship between local and central power is of crucial
importance for the process of imbuing symbols with meaning, leads us back to our
original interest: Is there any similarity between the ways how symbols are handled in
contemporary Chinese statistics and in traditional popular religion? Evidently, we are15
now able to describe both areas in terms of symbolic systems where formal structure is
determined by the Central autority but semantic reference is determined at least partly
on the local level.
4.  Sharing the Authority Over Meaning: Methodological Consequences 
for Chinese Studies
Let us hammer down the main items of similarity between both areas of social
behavior we have discussed.
1. The Central State claims a  monopoly of using and defining symbols in society.
2. However, there is a certain constraint on the full monopolization of the meaning of
symbols. The State focuses on the standardization of formal structure.
3. Meaning is given to symbols through the interaction between local community and
the Center. A localized semantics emerges.
4. The process of assigning meaning to symbols is an important medium of
balancing power and of realizing conflict between local community and the Center.
5. Precisely the restraint of the Center from monopolizing meaning seems to provide
legitimay to Central power because ambiguity of meaning means sharing authority
with the local community.
6. State building in the sense of establishing the structure of power inhering the
modern Nation State therefore means the introduction of a completely new relation
between power and the authority to assign meaning to symbols.
These observations match both of our descriptions of the statistical system and of
traditional popular religion. Hence we may speak of certain family similarities in the
sense of Wittgenstein.
In Contemporary Chinese Studies researchers with a more detailed knowledge of
the Chinese past refer to such family similarities between past and present fairly
frequently (for example, Shue, 1988, chpt. three, and Zelin, 1991). The main objective of
this approach is to learn something about China's present from the comparison with her
past. Yet, by means of such a comparison we do not learn anything about the possible
reasons of the similarities. For instance, we could refer to the theoretical construct of
"Chinese culture" in order to explain the similarities, or we could refer to the same
structural constraints (e.g. infrastructural constraints of state administration) and at the
same time reject cultural explanations. Our attempt at discovering family similarities in
completely unrelated areas of social action does not favour one exclusive explanation
but stresses cultural factors: Of paramount importance is the relation between social16
psychology and patterns of power (following Elias, 1969a-c, developed in Herrmann-
Pillath, 1993, 1994, and linked with aspects of traditional China in Wang Yi/Herrmann-
Pillath, 1992). However, our main interest in this note is not how to explain the family
similarities but to ask for the methodological consequences for Chinese studies (more
on this see Herrmann-Pillath, 1995a).
Methodologically, the common topic of our treatment of contemporary statistics and
traditional religion is translation. Our starting point was the economist's presumption that
translation is not needed in order to apply theory on data from China: a certain category
like gross investment is exactly determined by certain rules how to use the category,
and possible differences between Chinese rules and other rules can be ascertained
exactly and objectively. That means the categories would not be context-dependent, and
aside from the need to list certain pairs of two different phonetic expressions for the
same meaning in the two languages there is no need for true philological research. The
case of traditional religion is completely different. Obviously, there is the need to put
every use of certain symbols into their context because otherwise reference cannot be
identified. There are no general rules providing the meaning of a symbol in traditional
religion aside from those ones governing their formal use and appearance. Actual
reference depends on the setting and people using the symbols. To link denotation and
connotation is a philological task, be it realized by the historian dealing with written
sources, be it realized by the anthropologist talking with people.
But as we have learned from our short look at statistical practice in contemporary
China this assessment of relative methodological status can be wrong. In fact the use of
statistical categories reveals certain characteristics which are very close to religious
practice in traditional China. In particular, in both cases there is a strong interaction
between state and society on the local level. Certain statistical rules are imposed by the
state on society in order to give it a shape which conforms to the needs of stabilizing the
system of rule: The state claims the monopoly of defining and processing statistical data
about the economy in order to have a sound base for policy making. But at the same
time as society accepts (or, has to accept) this kind of symbolic standardization, people
also start to use the symbols in their own way in order to balance the state's
intrusiveness. The result is an astonishingly complex semantics of superficially clear-cut
symbols. In both cases of religion and statistics this refers to local variety of reference in
particular. Moreover, the conflict about the allocation of authority over meaning is at the
same time the conflict about the legitimacy of Central power and the political order it
represents. As in the case of the fundamental ambiguity of the symbols in traditional
religion, resistance against the Center finds expression in reaping the authority over
meaning from the Central government in the local statistical system.17
Which conclusions can be drawn out of our strange comparative exercise? The first
one simply is that the study of traditional China contributes to setting our perspectives
on contemporary China right. We have started with statistics, but in most cases the
direction of thought and discovery will be the other way round: Someone who has
knowledge about traditional China may interprete certain items of information about
contemporary China differently as compared with the general social scientist. But this
observation should also be turned the other way round: Without a thorough knowledge of
China's past there is no way to deal with contemporary statistics effectively. If we put it
this way, the emphasis will meet much more resistance. However, the dismal story of
the West using data about China should teach us that there is indeed the need for a
cultural approach to economic analysis even on the field of interpreting data. The data
are imbued with connotations which are rooted in the social process of statistical work
in China. This process displays sharp conflicts between the modernizing state and local
interests which we need to understand in order to understand the meaning of the data.
Hence, the economist, too, has to do the work of the philologist who explains the
connotations of the concepts of a foreign language to the reader.
On a more basic level we learn that economic concepts and theories cannot be
applied directly on data but under certain, fairly narrow conditions. There is a need to
insert intermediary concepts which refer to particular societies and periods. In the case
of China, this point has already been made in detail by Little (1990) who argued that
local knowledge is of paramount importance for linking theory with empirical data in
China. Our reflections on social semantics support this view. In the same way as
Chinese religion can only be properly understood as a localized belief system,
statistical data have to be seen in local context. Only if the linkage between local
knowledge and theory is interpreted as a mirror of the structure of social processes, an
empirically valid analysis of causal processes can be realized (see the attempt in
Herrmann-Pillath, 1991).
Finally, there seems to be a very close relation between processing symbols and
structures of power in Chinese society because political power rests upon the
legitimacy of representing a common cultural universe of Chineseness (Fitzgerald,
1994). However, this means that power cannot be used to change this cultural universe
without loosing legitimacy. In many different areas legitimacy of power is based on a
certain implicit agreement on the way how people deal with symbols, or more
specifically, items of information. Therefore, introducing a modern statistical system in
China may not be a mere technical act but an act of changing an essential feature of the
order of the Chinese body politic.18
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